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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 11-1656 & 11-3424 
 ___________ 
 
 HAMADI HAMID SOULEMAN, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A096 286 682) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2012 
 
 Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








 Hamadi Hamid Souleman petitions for review of two orders:  an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that dismissed his appeal from an Immigration 
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Judge’s final removal order and an order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will deny the petitions for review. 
I. 
 Souleman is a citizen of the Central African Republic.  He entered the United 
States in October 2001 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure.  He stayed beyond the 
time permitted by his visa and was served with a Notice to Appear.  At a hearing before 
the IJ, Souleman conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  While his applications were 
pending, he married a United States citizen, who filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative 
on his behalf.  The petition was approved in August 2005.  Souleman withdrew his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT on May 18, 
2007. 
 In February 2006, Souleman applied for adjustment of status.  During the 
pendency of the adjustment-of-status application, Souleman was involved in multiple 
incidents of domestic violence.  In April 2007, his wife obtained a temporary protective 
order against him after he destroyed several pieces of furniture in their home.  A.R. 1487-
90
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 (Temporary Protection from Abuse order).  In July 2007, police responded to a 
domestic-violence call and arrested Souleman.  A.R. 1493-96 (incident report and arrest 
report).  He was charged with various crimes, but the charges were dropped for lack of 
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prosecution.  The next incident of domestic violence occurred in September 2007, and he 
was again arrested and charged with various crimes, and the charges were again dropped 
for lack of prosecution.  A.R. 1475-79; 1491-92 (reports of police investigation); 1480-
84. 
 At another hearing before the IJ, Souleman’s wife offered favorable testimony on 
his behalf.  The Government offered the testimony of and reports written by several 
police officers who investigated the domestic-violence incidents.  This evidence 
conflicted with the wife’s testimony.  In addition, the Government called an expert 
witness on domestic violence.  The IJ found that Souleman was statutorily eligible for 
adjustment of status, but, in her discretion, denied relief.  The IJ found that several 
adverse factors weighed against Souleman.  Specifically, she discussed Souleman’s 
actions that led to his arrests and the temporary protective order, and expressed concern 
over his recidivism and failure to take responsibility for his actions.  The BIA adopted 
and affirmed the IJ’s decision on February 15, 2011.  Souleman filed a petition for 
review, and it was docketed at C.A. No. 11-1646.   
 On June 27, 2011, Souleman filed with the BIA a motion to reopen removal 
proceedings based on claims of changed country conditions and ineffective assistance of 
immigration trial counsel.  Although either changed country conditions or ineffective 
assistance of counsel can in some cases provide an exception to the timeliness 
requirements, the BIA denied the motion as untimely.  The BIA determined that  
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Souleman had failed to comply with procedural requirements for ineffective assistance 
claims.  It also determined that “[t]he claim of changed country conditions in the Central 
African Republic is based on limited background information that does not demonstrate 
materially changed conditions from those prevailing prior to and at the time of the 
respondent’s 2010 hearing before the Immigration Judge.”  A.R. 2. 
 Souleman filed a second petition for review, and it was docketed at C.A. No. 11-
3424.  By Order of the Clerk dated September 9, 2011, the two petitions for review were 
“consolidated for disposition only.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) (requiring consolidation 
under these circumstances).   
II. 
 “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the 
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and 
the BIA.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review legal 
conclusions de novo.  Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
Government argues that the petition for review of the BIA’s February 15, 2011 decision 
should be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review denials of 
discretionary relief.  The Government is correct in asserting that we cannot review 
denials of discretionary relief.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).  We thus lack jurisdiction to 
consider Souleman’s argument that the IJ’s decision denying him adjustment of status 
was against the weight of the evidence, as that argument “amount[s] to nothing more than 
[a] quarrel over the exercise of discretion and the correctness of the factual findings 
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reached by the agency.”  Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).   
 However, we do retain jurisdiction to review legal or constitutional questions.  
Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
Although the Government argues that Souleman does not raise any such questions, we 
discern one:  whether the IJ was allowed, as a matter of law, to consider as an adverse 
factor the conduct leading to Souleman’s arrests where the arrests never culminated in 
convictions.  See Billeke-Tolosa v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 708, 710-11 (6th Cir. 2004) (court 
has jurisdiction to consider whether BIA denied adjustment of status in violation of BIA 
precedent).  We conclude that the IJ did not err.  In Matter of Arreguin, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
38, 42 (1995), the BIA held that it would give little weight to an arrest record where 
prosecution was declined, and there was no corroboration of the conduct from the 
applicant or otherwise.  See also Billeke-Tolosa, 385 F.3d at 712 (IJ erred in considering 
applicant’s sexual abuse arrest history where he had not been convicted of any crime and 
no evidence was presented to suggest that he had committed sexual abuse).  Here, in 
contrast, the IJ considered not only arrest reports, but also:  (1) testimony of police 
officers who encountered Souleman’s wife when she reported abuse, and who 
investigated and participated in Souleman’s arrest; (2) Souleman’s wife’s testimony at 





 (3) Souleman’s own testimony that he had “laid hands on” his 
wife; (4) the fact that Souleman’s wife had obtained a protection from abuse order against 
him in April 2007; and (5) expert testimony.
3
  The IJ was entitled to consider this 
evidence in her discretionary determination.  See Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
1996) (“while an arrest, without more, is simply an unproven charge, the fact of the 
arrest, and its attendant circumstances, often have probative value in immigration 
proceedings”); See also Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec. 20, 23-25 (BIA 1995) (en 
banc) (BIA and courts appropriately consider unfavorable conduct by alien, even in 
absence of conviction). 
 Souleman raises one other issue in connection with his first petition for review, 
unrelated to the decision to deny him adjustment of status:  he alleges he was unaware 
and did not consent to his attorney’s decision to withdraw his asylum application.  We 
lack jurisdiction to review this claim in the context of the first petition for review because 
Souleman failed to exhaust the issue in his brief to the BIA.  A.R. 196-207 (brief); 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  In any event, it appears that his assertion is false.  A.R. at 900-01. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review filed at C.A. No. 
11-1656. 
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 In the preliminary hearing, Souleman’s wife testified that Souleman punched her in the 
face, destroyed the telephone to prevent her from calling the police, threw her on the 
couch, and punched her in the stomach, although she was pregnant. 
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 We of course lack jurisdiction to review the weight that the IJ and BIA gave to this 




 We now turn to the petition for review of the order denying Souleman’s motion to 
reopen.  We review the BIA’s decision denying a motion to reopen for abuse of 
discretion and review its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence.  Shardar v. 
Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will uphold the denial of a motion to 
reopen unless the decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Id. 
 There is no question that Souleman’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-
day time limitation for filing such a motion.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring that 
such a motion be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
administrative decision was rendered).  As recognized by the BIA, the 90-day time 
limitation does not apply where an applicant seeks asylum based on changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality.  Id. § 1003.2(c)(3).  The BIA also 
recognized that the period may be equitably tolled due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, if such allegations are substantiated and accompanied by a showing of due 
diligence.  Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 In order to meet the “changed circumstances” exception, Souleman was required 
to present material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been 
presented during his hearing before the IJ.  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313.  Souleman disputes 
the BIA’s conclusion that he did not establish changed conditions in the Central African 
Republic since his September 2, 2010 hearing.  However, in his brief he has not cited to 
                                                                                                                                                             
were corroborated by evidence outside the arrest reports. 
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any evidence of record supporting his contention that country conditions have changed.  
Further, as the Government notes in its brief, the sole piece of evidence that Souleman 
presented with his motion to reopen that was not available at the time of the previous 
hearing was a 2011 Amnesty International article.  Although that article describes some 
horrific conditions, it does not describe conditions materially different than the conditions 
at the time of Souleman’s prior hearing.  A.R. 39-40.  Souleman has not shown that the 
record compels the conclusion that country conditions have changed or that the BIA’s 
decision to deny reopening on this basis is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.
4
 
 We further find no error in the BIA’s determination that Souleman had not met the 
procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), 
for pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 
F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (outlining those requirements); Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 
127, 129 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the Lozada requirements are a reasonable exercise 
of the Board’s discretion.”).  As the BIA noted, Souleman did not indicate that he had 
filed a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authority or adequately explain why he 
had not done so, nor did he inform prior counsel about his allegations of ineffectiveness 
                                                 
4
 Souleman also notes that he sent a letter to the BIA stating that he “would like to submit 
more evidence,” that as he was writing the letter, the evidence was “being sent to me via 
mail,” and asking “to have a little time” to submit the evidence.  A.R. 27.  Souleman 
claims that the BIA did not address his request.  However, Souleman has not shown that 
he was prejudiced by the BIA’s failure to address the request.  He has not indicated that 




or provide counsel an opportunity to respond.  A.R. 2.  We conclude that the BIA 
decision to deny reopening as untimely was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petitions for review.
5
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 The Government’s motion to dismiss, filed in 11-1656, is granted in part and denied in 
part, as discussed in Section II, above.  Souleman’s motion to reopen and remand and 
supplemental motion to reopen and remand, both filed in 11-1656, are denied as moot as 
the BIA has considered and denied Souleman’s motion to reopen.  Souleman’s motion to 
take judicial notice is granted to the extent that this Court will take notice of his changed 
place of detention.  The motion is denied to the extent Souleman seeks review of criminal 
charges filed against him, as such a review is beyond the scope of these proceedings.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
